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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how the unique financial model of multilateral development 
banks—dependent largely on issuing bonds in private capital markets to raise lending 
resources—came about in the early history of three different MDBs, and how this in turn 
shaped their operational characteristics. Historical research demonstrates that the World 
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Andean Development Corporation 
(CAF) converged on organizational and operational arrangements very different to what 
their founders had intended, and much closer to one another, as a direct result of the need 
to secure sufficient resources to function as viable development lenders. The findings 
indicate that in the absence of governments willing or able to provide significant 
financing out of their budgets, MDBs tend to converge toward a single organizational 
model in order to maintain access to international capital markets. All three MDBs 
examined here modified their lending and financial policies in unexpected ways and, in 
the case of the IADB and CAF, even restructured their original membership, specifically 
for the purpose of securing adequate financial resources. 
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Introduction 
 
The first multilateral development bank (MDB) was created in 1944 with the founding of the 
World Bank, and they have since proliferated across the globe. According to one count, some 20 
MDBs currently operate in some or all parts of the world, and—if the plans of the BRICS nations 
come to fruition1
 
—another will likely soon be created. Considering this track record, one can 
safely say that this specialized model of international organization has proved to be well suited to 
the needs of governments in the global political and economic context of the past 70-odd years, 
and remains so today.  
The members of this particular “family” of organizations differ in a number of ways—technical 
assistance capacity, types of loans and operational rules, degree of grants vs. loans—but have 
many important traits in common.2 Most obviously, they are all owned by governments and 
predominantly lend to governments for the purposes of development, broadly defined. But 
perhaps the one trait that goes farthest in explaining their success as an organizational model is 
that they are mainly self-financing: MDBs borrow most of their money on international capital 
markets, and then on-lend these resources at terms better than recipient countries could generally 
get themselves in the markets, with enough of a margin left over to cover MDB administrative 
costs. Thus, regular operations imply no direct budgetary cost to shareholder governments, apart 
from relatively minimal capitalization costs,3
                                                 
1 Financial Times, 2013.  
 and MDBs (arguably) generate the public good of 
development promotion, as well as potential geo-political benefits to powerful shareholders, as 
2 For one definition see IDS, 2000: 4. 
3 Much of which is actually in callable, guarantee capital, rather than cash. For example, of the World Bank’s 
US$205.4 billion in capital, only US$12.4 billion (6%) is paid in by 188 member countries, while the remainder 
(94%) is guaranteed.  
highlighted by numerous researchers including Mohammed, 2004; Dreher et al., 2009; Gilbert et 
al., 1999; Harrigan et al., 2006; and Kapur, 2002, to name just a few. 
 
How did this mechanism of utilizing bond markets come to be the standard financial model for 
MDBs, rather than direct transfers from member governments as in many other international 
organizations? The answer is relatively straightforward: MDBs require considerable levels of 
resources if they are to fulfill their development mission, and the generosity of most shareholder 
governments is limited, especially in funding a multilateral organization over which they do not 
have complete control. Powerful countries may be willing to offer their backing to MDB bonds, 
and even make some contributions for concessional loans to the poorest countries, but they have 
scant interest in coming up with significant volumes of money for regular MDB operations. 
Accessing private financial markets is therefore the only realistic alternative if an MDB is to 
survive as a viable international organization capable of undertaking significant development 
operations.  
 
Relying on international capital markets rather than fiscal allocations give MDBs a degree of 
financial security and independence from the fickle generosity of shareholder countries, but this 
comes with a cost. As recent events in several southern European nations have shown, bond 
markets are extraordinarily unsympathetic to those who do not perform as they demand. Not for 
nothing did the U.S. political consultant guru James Carville once comment that if reincarnation 
existed, “I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody” (Wall Street 
Journal 1993: A1).  
 
The historical record shows that using capital markets as the key source of financing had a 
fundamentally important impact on the way each of the three MDBs considered in this article—
the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF)—were run. In each case, financial imperatives and pressures exerted by 
private capital markets partly undermined the original conceptions of MDB founders, leading 
each MDB to move in unexpected directions as a result. The use of capital markets for financing 
was in itself not a shock to founding members, and was in fact expected as a basic element of all 
three MDBs’ financial models (although in each case not to the degree that would eventually be 
the case). What founders did not foresee was how this external source of financing would shape 
the way the MDBs sought to fulfill their mandates, as well as their membership structure.  
 
The lessons of organizational sociology suggest that when an organization is faced with a 
conflict between maintaining rigid adherence to its original mission and securing the resources 
needed to survive, the former is frequently sacrificed to the latter. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
note that almost all organizations, both public and private, depend for survival on resources over 
which they have only limited control, be it paying clients, budgetary allocations or, in the case of 
MDBs, bond buyers.4
                                                 
4 The MDB model also requires a steady stream of countries willing to borrow from them. This was a minimal issue 
during the time period considered here (demand for loans far outstripped supply), but is now a much more important 
issue for many MDBs in light of the growing financial strength of many middle-income countries. See Humphrey 
and Michaelowa, 2013.  
 Expanding on this idea with specific reference to international 
organizations, Barnett and Coleman (2005) conceive of IOs as strategic actors dealing with a 
complex external environment, and reacting in ways that ensure access to essential external 
resources: “The more dependent they are on others, the more likely IOs will alter their activities 
in a way that conforms to these external demands and standards.” (Barnett and Coleman 2005: 
599).  
 
At the same time, the authors recognize the importance of constructivist concepts such as 
professional self-image and institutional culture, and posit these as limitations on how far an 
organization will bend itself in pursuit of resources—a limitation not considered by more 
rationalist public-choice oriented scholars: “…because conformity might come at a cost to their 
autonomy and ability to pursue their mandate as they define it, IO staff will be attentive to the 
autonomy-resource trade-off.” (Barnett and Coleman 2005: 595). The authors explore how 
Interpol initially resisted moving into the area of terrorism because of concerns about becoming 
enmeshed in politics and giving up autonomy, despite potentially greater resources, and the 
organization’s eventual acquiescence in the face of competition and resource strain.  
 
The trade-off between resources and organizational autonomy from political influence takes on a 
different character in the particular case of MDBs, because of their use of capital markets as 
opposed to the budgetary allocations. In a sense, this is not a simple continuum of giving up 
more or less autonomy in exchange for resources, as Barnett and Coleman suggest, but rather 
losing a degree of autonomy to one kind of external authority (bond markets) instead of another 
(member states).  
 
The question then arises as to whether the dependence of MDBs on financial markets, and the 
constraints it implied, clashed with i) the aims of powerful shareholding (that is, realist views of 
international organizations) and/or ii) the organizational culture and professional self-image of 
staff (that is, more constructivist views). The evidence reviewed here indicates that reliance on 
bond markets strongly suited the interests of powerful shareholders, as it limited their fiscal 
contributions, and the exigencies that this model engendered did not threaten the overall aims of 
these shareholders for the MDBs. At the same time, the fact that MDBs can raise the resources 
needed to operate by issuing bonds means that shareholders have less direct “power of the purse” 
over the MDB. This, in turn, has afforded MDBs considerably more operational autonomy from 
shareholders than might otherwise be the case, in part fueling the tensions between shareholders 
and staff explored by many scholars using principal-agent frameworks (for example, Gutner 
2005 and Hawkins, et al. 2006). 
 
Evidence from the three case studies also suggests that each MDB’s organizational culture was 
strongly shaped by the requirements of obtaining necessary resources. In all three cases, the 
MDBs shifted away from certain types of development practices and membership structures in 
ways that clearly obeyed the necessities of securing financing from capital markets. It may well 
be that staff resisted these changes—this paper does not explore the issue—but in the end the 
changes occurred and the resources were secured. Chwieroth (2008) examines some of the same 
issues considered here in relation to the early history of the World Bank, and concludes that this 
is a case of “change from within” driven by normative entrepreneurship on the part of key staff 
members. The current research parallels Chwieroth’s piece very closely in many respects, but 
finds evidence to suggest that the change was the result of external rather than internal pressures, 
as will be discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
 
A key reason why these MDBs were able to shift away from the original conceptions of their 
founders and reshape the internal culture to suit the needs of resource acquisition was the nature 
of their mandate. As Babb (2003) points out in her analysis of the IMF in the 1970s, the 
organizational mandate of IOs is uniquely ambiguous, resulting from complex international 
negotiations that necessitate a healthy degree of vagueness to reach a final agreement among 
competing interests. This ambiguity, Babb suggests, allows IOs a particularly high degree of 
room to maneuver in redefining their mandates as needed for survival. In the case of MDBs, the 
goal of promoting development is especially ambiguous, not just in how one should best pursue 
it but even in defining exactly what constitutes “development” in the first place—both topics that 
are the subject of intense and continuous debate. This proved extremely useful as MDBs faced 
the realities of endearing themselves bond markets while at the same time claiming to 
successfully fulfill their mandate.  
 
This paper examines how each of the three MDBs changed their operations and even (in the case 
of the IADB and CAF) their membership structure in response to the requirements of 
international capital markets to ensure their survival. What is more, the research reveals that 
changes in each MDB all pointed in a similar direction, converging on a model of MDB activity 
much closer to one another than their founders had intended. Thus, if one presupposes: i) the 
limited willingness of governments to provide budgetary resources to MDBs and ii) a built-in 
desire for organizational survival, then there seems to be almost an “ideal type” of MDB, toward 
which all will tend to evolve. 
 
The following three sections consider how the World Bank, IADB and CAF each grappled with 
the problem of securing the resources they needed to survive and grow, and how this directly 
impacted their operations. The periods to be examined are the World Bank 1947-1963, the IADB 
1960-1975 and the CAF 1970-1993. In each case this encompasses the early phase of 
organizational life cycle: conception, birth and adolescence. Each case concludes with a turning 
point that deeply shaped the MDBs we see today—their “mature” form. 
 
The World Bank: From New Deal to Wall Street and Part Way Back Again 
 
The idea of a multilateral development bank began at least as early as 1890, when a number of 
Latin American countries pushed for the creation of a specialized bank to facilitate capital flows 
to their region (Kapur, et al., 1997). In 1942, a U.S. Treasury team under the leadership Harry 
Dexter White, who had worked on an earlier, abortive inter-American bank proposal (U.S. 
Department of State, 1940; Helleiner, 2006 and 2009), took up the ideas again during the Bretton 
Woods conference when designing the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD)—more commonly known as the World Bank—to facilitating credit flows for 
reconstruction after the war. All member countries agreed to pay in a determined amount of cash 
and gold (20%), and guarantee the bank’s remaining capital subscription to be called on if 
necessary to meet its obligations. The bank would be governed by country shareholders with 
voting power directly proportional to their contributions—just as a private corporation. Perhaps 
not coincidentally, this scheme afforded the U.S. a dominant voice in controlling the Bank. 
 
The Roosevelt and subsequent Truman administrations viewed the newly created World Bank 
primarily as a tool of government, not Wall Street. This was manifested in locating it in 
Washington DC, over the objections of several European countries, who favored New York. As 
Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson wrote at the time, referring to the World Bank and IMF, “They 
are cooperative enterprises of governments and their chief business is with governments…They 
should not become just two more financial institutions” (1946: 626). The U.S. intended to keep a 
tight reign over the Bank’s administrators by making them subservient to a board of executive 
directors representing member countries, which would sit in permanent session and vote on all 
decisions. Again, Vinson explained the logic: “If final authority is vested in the administrative 
officials, the Executive Directors become little more than an advisory body. In my opinion, this 
would be contrary to the manner in which it was intended to operate the Fund and the Bank” 
(Ibid.: 627).  
 
It was generally assumed at Bretton Woods that the World Bank would primarily offer 
guarantees for governments borrowing from private sources, rather then lending directly. 
However, both New York investors and the new Bank management were unenthusiastic about 
guarantees, for a number of practical reasons (Mason and Asher, 1973).5 But if the Bank would 
be making loans rather than guarantees, it faced a serious shortage of capital. The only lendable 
resources available to the Bank at its launch were the U.S. paid-in capital and the 2% paid in 
gold by other members—a total of US$727 million.6
                                                 
5 Even with a guarantee, many countries would still be paying considerably more for money then if the Bank 
borrowed itself and lent it on, which didn’t make sense. As well, regardless of the guarantee, the markets would 
offer differing interest rates to different clients, which the IBRD feared could impact its own credit rating. 
 This paled in comparison to the 
6 This was due to the insistence of the British at Bretton Woods—led by J. M. Keynes—that the member currency 
portion of paid-in capital would only be used for lending with the explicit consent of the country (Bittermann, 1971). 
Thus only the 2% of capital paid in convertible currencies for all countries (except the U.S., which contributed the 
full 20% in convertible currency) could be used for lending.  
reconstruction needs of post-war Europe. Just the first two loan applications alone, from France 
and Netherlands, totaled US$1.035 billion. As a result, turning to the markets was a clear 
necessity right from the start, as noted at the time by The Economist: “The French loan alone 
obviously earmarks a substantial portion of the total stock of dollars. Hence the Bank must soon 
determine its ability to obtain more dollars, which of course can only be done by borrowing in 
the American market…Consequently, extensive explorations are under way with the market” 
(1947b: 760).  
 
As it became increasingly clear that the bank would need a strong relationship with the markets, 
the early leaders were recruited from Wall Street. John J. McCloy, a lawyer with strong 
connections to the New York financial community, was persuaded to accept the presidency in 
late 1946.7
                                                 
7 The first president was Eugene Meyer, who resigned after only a few months on the job. 
 Before doing so, McCloy set as his conditions that the board make a clear statement 
ensuring that management would be allowed a generally free hand in running operations, and the 
board would confine itself to a supervisory role—directly against the model described by Vinson 
above. His reasoning was that the markets would simply not trust the bonds of an institution 
governed on a day-to-day basis by politicians. The Bank’s executive directors resisted, but faced 
with McCloy’s threat to walk out immediately, they backed down (WBOH 1961a: 4). Thus right 
at the start of its operations, in the interests of establishing a “serious” financial institution free 
from political meddling, McCloy ensured a far greater degree of staff autonomy from the 
political influence of executive directors than originally envisioned at Bretton Woods. McCloy 
brought with him Robert Garner to serve as his vice-president, a hard-nosed New York banker, 
and U.S. executive director Eugene Black, former vice-president of Chase National Bank of New 
York. The Economist magazine noted with satisfaction that the new leadership were “nominees 
of Wall Street” (1947a: 638). Black himself, in a later interview, made clear his view on the 
importance of non-political leadership of the Bank in the eyes of the bond markets: “…if they 
tried to put some politician in there [Bank leadership], nobody would buy the bonds. They 
wouldn't have any money” (WBOH 1961b: 53). 
 
Despite the Wall Street-friendly management, private financial markets had every reason to be 
wary of lending to this unknown new financial creature, which was specifically designed to lend 
to foreign countries, many of them poor and with a long history of defaults—hardly a business 
model to gain Wall Street’s trust. Thus the initial forays of World Bank staff to New York were 
not a resounding success. Recounting his first trip to meet investment bankers in New York, one 
staffer said, “There was an amazing discrepancy between the attitude of the bankers and the 
expectations of Bretton Woods …In general, it was thought of as a do-good institution, as a wild 
idea, without any respectable support” (WBOH 1961c: 10-11). Winning over the financial 
community became the primary objective of the new bank’s staff—without the trust of the 
markets, it could not survive.  
 
The intensive preparatory work of the Bank leadership, as well as their personal contacts and 
good reputation on Wall Street, paid off when the Bank’s first two bonds were publicly issued on 
July 15, 1947, for US$250 million—the exact amount of the Bank’s first loan, just issued to 
France (Mason and Asher, 1973). Despite this success, future prospects for regular bond issues 
were far from certain. The following year, an article in The Economist noted that “Since 
[Bank’s] dollar resources cannot be allowed to run down completely, the remaining scope for 
dollar loans is modest and will remain so unless Wall Street can be induced to absorb another 
issue of the IBRD’s bonds. There is very little prospect of this at the moment” (1948: 502). The 
Bank would not issue again in the New York market until 1950. Establishing a regular presence 
as a borrower would take more than good marketing—it would require demonstrating that the 
Bank would operate in a way that made it a safe investment. This, in turn, would fundamentally 
shape the Bank’s lending. 
 
Wall Street Concerns Shape Early Operating Policies  
 
McCloy’s team made no bones at all about the principles that guided early lending operations. In 
presenting the second annual report to the Board of Directors in September 1947, McCloy stated 
that “the Bank must attach importance to the views of the American investor and must conduct 
its activities in such a fashion that its bonds will be considered a sound business risk by the 
United States financial community” (Mason and Asher 1973: 54). A few years later Garner—
who was in charge of operations at the time—stated that “The Bank must convince the private 
investors who buy its bonds that it is operating on sound banking principles. Otherwise, we 
might be cut off from one of our main sources of funds for lending” (World Bank, 1952). 
 
In the three years between Bretton Woods and the Bank’s first loan to France in May 1947, U.S. 
policymakers drew up the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction. This removed what had 
been the Bank’s initial purpose—post-war reconstruction—and also removed what would have 
been its most creditworthy borrowers. Thus the Bank was quickly pushed into the unknown 
territory of “development.” Between August 1947 and the end of 1949, the Bank made only 
three loans, two to Chile for US$28 million and one to the Netherlands for US$12 million. This 
was driven by the inability to raise more money on the market, and also by the desire to establish 
exacting technical standards for loan approval that would be seen as prudent by potential bond 
investors. “We had then to show that we were going to make some sound loans, that we were not 
going to give the money away. Until we did that and until we acquainted people with what the 
other safeguards were, the Bank had no credit,” said Black, reflecting on this period (WBOH 
1961b: 7).  
 
A key aspect of how the Bank established and guarded its credit standing with the markets was 
the kind of loans it made. The Articles of Agreement call for lending only for “specific projects”, 
although (with characteristic vagueness) this could be bypassed in “special circumstances.” The 
specific project ethos became an obsession with the early Bank.8 One of the great advantages of 
the specific project, as one early staffer openly admitted, was that it looked good to the markets. 
“The market likes the idea of specific projects,” said one. “There's a feeling that if you know 
exactly where the money goes, it must be a sound thing” (WBOH 1961d: 41). The Bank focused 
on projects that would generate income, and hence increase its chances of getting repaid. This 
meant physical infrastructure with direct economic impacts. “I think that if we got into the social 
field in the Bank then the bond market would definitely feel that we were not acting prudently 
from a financial standpoint,” said one early staffer. “If you start financing schools and hospitals 
and water works, and so forth, these things don't normally and directly increase the ability of a 
country to repay a borrowing” (WBOH 1961e: 63-4).9
                                                 
8 This is despite the fact that the almost complete fungibility of money in a borrowing government’s accounts made 
the “specific project” a myth. See, for example, Feyzioglu et al. (1998). For a detailed examination of the project 
culture in the Bank’s early years, see Chwieroth (2008) 
 This led to a very heavy emphasis on 
9 The avoidance of socially-oriented loans in the early World Bank is discussed in Alacevich, 2009. 
electric power, transportation infrastructure and large-scale irrigation works, which were seen as 
sound, bankable projects (Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1. IBRD Lending by Sector, 1947-61 
 
Source: World Bank annual reports 1947-1961.  
 
Hand in hand with the specific project lending style, the Bank also evolved a rigorous and 
intrusive system of resource disbursement. In choosing which countries to lend to, the issue of 
need or income level played a minimal role, while a country’s perceived credit risk was a major 
factor. “The general idea was quite clear even at that early stage that the Bank could lend only if 
it were satisfied that it could get its money back. Therefore, a study of the economy of the 
country was pretty fundamental,” said an early staffer (WBOH 1961d: 5). Thus, the Bank’s 
extreme intrusiveness into domestic economic policy began right from the start, specifically to 
reassure its bond buyers that it was keeping a close eye on its resources.  
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As well, lending was slanted heavily toward more creditworthy borrowers, rather than poorer 
countries. Out of US$5.7 billion in Bank loan commitments between 1947 and 1961, US$2.6 
billion (45%) went to Europe or Australia and a further US$1.4 billion (25%) to larger and more 
advanced developing countries.10 Only US$1.7 billion (30%) was dedicated to poorer developing 
countries, of which nearly US$1 billion went to India and Pakistan— countries of key 
geopolitical interest to the U.S. and the U.K., the Bank’s two most powerful shareholders at the 
time.11
 
 Hence, poverty considerations appear to have been a low priority in directing where the 
Bank lent its money. 
An Embarrassment of Riches and the Birth of IDA 
 
As a result of the operational policies described above, the World Bank reputation as a “sound” 
financial institution grew. The spread between Bank and U.S. government bonds of similar 
maturities fell from 0.74% in 1947 to 0.25% in 1952 (Mason and Asher, 1973), and the Bank 
began accessing capital markets outside of the U.S. However, the Bank’s increasingly solid 
financial situation and excellent reputation in the credit markets had no impact on the tough 
conditions for borrowers. As early as 1950, even The Economist was calling for it to relax: 
“Recent experience has shown that its rigid approach and conditions of lending (for which there 
is something to be said on other grounds) do not provide a flexible means of handling the infinite 
variety of projects that must emerge from any programme for the opening up of under-developed 
                                                 
10 This includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Iran, Israel, Mexico, South Africa and Uruguay. 
11 This includes: Burma, Ceylon, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sudan, and Thailand. 
countries. It resembles commercial banks in the United States in that it is too intent on the 
collateral or security aspect of any operation” (1950: 546).  
 
But Bank leadership fended off calls for change, invariably pointing to the fickle opinion of the 
all-important bond market. There was some justification for this position in light of the Bank’s 
long-running battle to receive the coveted AAA rating by the ratings agencies, which was finally 
granted in 1959. Other evidence, however, suggests that while the Bank’s operating style may 
have been a necessity to access resources in the first years, it had simply become ingrained 
behavior by the end of the 1950s. One high-level staffer noted that by 1961, bond holders no 
longer “scrutinize the day-to-day lending operations the way they used to,” adding that if the 
Bank wanted to start lending for things like water distribution, “I don't think these things would 
have the slightest affect on its credit” (WBOH 1961f: 65). But preoccupation with bond buyers 
had planted deep roots in the Bank’s organizational culture, as analyzed incisively by Chwieroth 
(2008).  
 
By the end of the 1950s the Bank’s net income increased each year and reserves grew from 
US$4 million in 1948 to US$288 million in 1964. As a result, the Bank faced rising criticism to 
ease the terms of its loans and to ramp up lending to address development concerns. A 1951 
United Nations report, calling for billions more to be lent annually for development, states that 
“In view of the need of under-developed countries for capital, the Bank cannot be said to be 
meeting the challenge of the circumstances…The Bank has not adequately realized that it is an 
agency charged by the United Nations with the duty of promoting economic development” (UN 
1951: 82-3). The report then goes on to propose the creation of an International Development 
Authority in the UN for the express purpose of overcoming the many limitations of the Bank.  
 
The World Bank vigorously fought the proposal, and because of its financial autonomy, the UN 
could do little to change its policies. As one Bank staffer charged at the time with negotiating 
with the UN put it laconically: “They [the UN] are the central global body, and they feel they 
ought to be able to exercise authority over all the other international agencies. On the other hand, 
the Bank has the money” (WBOH 1961c: 20). But by the late 1950s, the Eisenhower 
administration—faced with the movement of the Cold War to “Third World” countries in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia—came around to the view that more resources were needed to help fight 
the communist threat. However, the U.S. insisted that the new lending body be housed at the 
Bank rather than the UN, for the obvious reason that the U.S. had veto power at the Bank 
because of its governance structure proportionate to shares rather than one country, one vote as 
in the UN. Most developing countries naturally objected, but since the U.S. would be putting up 
most of the funding, they could do little about it.  
 
Bank staff ensured that the new the International Development Association (IDA) would be 
implemented in such a way that it would not negatively impact the Bank’s credit. One key point 
was that while IDA would be run by the Bank, it would have completely separate financial 
accounts from the non-concessional IBRD lending window. The point, according to a high-level 
staffer at the time, was to “assure investors in Bank bonds that their interest in the Bank would 
not be diluted by the diversion of funds into the softer IDA channels” (WBOH 1961g: 34). In 
reality, this was (and remains) an elaborate fiction, since from the start the same staff worked on 
both IBRD and IDA loans in all countries around the world.   
 
Bank staff soon saw that IDA had its uses. For a start, it allowed the Bank to offload many of its 
riskiest borrowers (notably India and Pakistan) to IDA, thus dramatically improving the quality 
of the IBRD’s portfolio. The IBRD’s share of high-risk loans fells sharply after IDA was created, 
from a peak of 27.3% in 1963 to 20% in 1967 and 15% in 1975, “presumably resulting from the 
introduction of IDA”, commented an internal report (cited in Kapur et al. 1997: 933). Eugene 
Rotberg, a long-serving treasurer of the World Bank, described the importance of IDA to the 
Bank as follows: “It’s more of a safety valve to permit economic and financial support to 
countries which are not credit-worthy but, if it were not available, would probably get some 
Bank lending at the margin and, in so doing, I believe jeopardize the financial credibility of the 
Bank” (WBOH 1994: 31). Further, IDA provided a useful means for easing pressure on the 
allocation of IBRD net income. By 1964, reserves had grown so large that the Bank feared the 
U.S. Congress would try to redirect it to the UN. Hence the Bank began making allocations out 
of IBRD net income to IDA—thus keeping the resources “in house” due to the extensive overlap 
between IBRD and IDA operations.  
 
Summarizing World Bank Findings 
 
The World Bank was originally founded as a New Deal-type organization, controlled by member 
governments and with fundamentally political aims. However, the model designed at Bretton 
Woods was quickly overturned. To access sufficient resources to establish itself as a meaningful 
development bank, it had to be able to issue bonds at attractive financial terms. And if the Bank 
was to access the markets, then logically it would be obliged to institute operational policies that 
ensured a track record of repayments and organizational finances sufficiently strong to win the 
approval of ratings agencies and investors, who had little or no interest in the Bank’s 
development mission. This led directly management ascendency in controlling bank policy over 
the executive directors, the specific project ethos that restricted lending to “profitable” projects, a 
focus on creditworthiness as opposed to country need to determine lending allocations, deep 
investigation and involvement with borrowing country macro-economic policy and a fixation 
with generating net income and reserves.  
 
In his analysis of the same time period in the Bank’s history, Chwieroth (2008) argues that the 
rise of project-focused lending practices was due to normative entrepreneurship on the part of 
key staffers, rather than the influence of capital markets and resource dependence (which the 
author also explicitly acknowledges). Hence, in Chwieroth’s view, this is a case of organizational 
change “from within.” The evidence reviewed here complements this analysis, but points to a 
slightly different conclusion: that the Bank’s organizational culture was indeed a key factor in 
shaping operations, but that it was itself deeply shaped by an external factor: the need to secure 
resources from bond markets.  
 
Despite the single-minded obsession with securing resources from bond markets, the Bank was 
not simply a financial institution focused only on credit risk and the financial bottom line—it 
was (and is) a deeply political organization. The growing awareness among wealthy nations of 
poverty in the rest of the world and the social tensions it could lead to, as well as the unhappiness 
with the Bank’s restrictive policies, led to the creation of IDA. The advent of IDA began shifting 
the World Bank’s operations more toward social aspects of development and poverty alleviation, 
rather than just heavy infrastructure.  But the obsession with running the World Bank in a way 
that would please bond markets was by then deeply ingrained and would only change going 
forward at a very slow pace, as highlighted by Chwieroth (2008).  
 
The schizophrenic character of the World Bank—proclaiming its allegiance with the poor while 
at the same time keeping a constant watchful eye on its financial bottom line—was replicated in 
subsequent MDBs, although with different dynamics due to varying shareholder interests and 
international circumstances.    
 
Inter-American Development Bank: A New Kind of MDB? 
 
The creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was in many ways a direct result 
of the conservative lending policies of the World Bank outlined above, coupled with the 
changing strategic views of the U.S. Latin American countries were clamoring for large amounts 
of external capital to build up their domestic industries, but the World Bank could not (or would 
not) supply either the quantity or type of lending the region desired. In the 14 years between 
1947 and 1961, the Bank lent a total of US$1.3 billion to all of Latin America, and in line with 
the specific project ethos, fully 90 percent of Bank lending was for electric power and 
transportation (World Bank, 1962). Not a single loan was dedicated to state-run or private 
domestic industry—the main preoccupation of Latin American governments at the time—or for 
any social projects such as water supply, housing, or education (Ibid.).  
 The Organization for American States (OAS) organized a series of conferences in the mid-1950s 
to address the region’s external financing needs, and proposed creating a new regional 
development bank. Conference participants criticized the World Bank for lending too little, not 
lending to countries that did not follow determined economic policies, restricting loans to only a 
few types of projects and charging too high an interest rate (Broide, 1961). By contrast, the 
proposed new bank would support “certain operations that might not generate income to cover 
the financial service payments, but should be nonetheless granted as they are necessary to 
increase the productivity and quality of life of Latin American countries,” such as sewage, 
housing and water supply (Ibid.: 82, author’s translation). But because the proposed bank lacked 
U.S. support, the agreement was never ratified. 
 
During the late 1950s, however, the U.S. began to be concerned over the potential for instability 
and threat to its global strategic interests in the region. The growing Cuban insurgency led by 
Fidel Castro against a pro-U.S. dictator, coupled with Vice-President Richard Nixon’s disastrous 
tour of South America in early 1958—during which he was greeted by angry mobs at all his 
stops and nearly assaulted in Caracas—brought home the depths of antipathy felt toward the U.S. 
in the hemisphere. As the Economist put it, referring to the bank proposal: “This is a Latin 
American dream, regularly spurned as unrealistic by the United States until Vice-President 
Nixon’s unfortunate experiences last year made the Administration realize that it might be a 
good thing to make a dream come true” (1959: 273). U.S. support for a regional development 
bank was announced in August 1958. 
 
Once the U.S. was on board, creation of the new bank moved ahead quickly, and it did so almost 
entirely on the terms dictated by the U.S. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. proposal hewed very closely 
to the model of the World Bank in terms of capital structure and overall operational policy. 
However, the U.S. proposed innovations to address Latin American concerns. The most notable 
was the creation of a concessional lending window akin to IDA—the Fund for Special 
Operations (FSO)—as an integral part of the new bank, to provide low-interest financing for 
countries not able to pay market-based rates of the ordinary lending window (“Ordinary Capital”, 
or OC), and for specific projects considered less “bankable”. The IADB’s charter also permitted 
more flexibility than the World Bank to make loans directly to private industry without requiring 
a government guarantee, an important demand of Latin American countries intent on developing 
their domestic industrial base (IADB, 1996) but considered by the World Bank to be too risky 
from a repayment point of view. 
 
U.S. support came at a price. The original 18 Latin countries had a majority share on the IADB’s 
board, and hence in theory could join together to out-vote the U.S. This contrasts with the World 
Bank, in which industrialized countries controlled 75.6% of total voting shares in 1960 (Fig. 2). 
But the U.S. demanded veto power over FSO operations, due to the fact that it contributed two-
thirds of the initial resources of the concessional fund, as well as veto power over changes to the 
IADB’s capital structure or charter (Ibid.).12
                                                 
12 The U.S. has also always held veto power over changes to World Bank capital structure and charter, though it 
does not have a formal veto over IDA operations.  
 There is no record of dissent on this point during the 
convention, nor was there serious opposition to naming Washington DC to be the bank’s 
headquarters (Broide, 1961), which suggest that the Latin countries were well aware of the limits 
of the U.S.’s benevolence. 
 Figure 2. Voting Power at the IBRD and IADB 
 
Source: Annual reports World Bank and IADB, 1960. 
 
Borrowers’ Honeymoon 
 
The dominance of the U.S. was not a cause of conflict in the early years of the IADB’s existence, 
for the simple reason that the interests of both the U.S. and other member governments were 
relatively closely aligned. All parties wanted to ramp up the flow of external capital to Latin 
America and to undertake loans that the World Bank did not consider, in particular for social 
projects and industry. Concessional lending quickly assumed a large role in the new bank. The 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations funded FSO lending to the tune of US$2.275 billion 
between 1960 and 1967.13
                                                 
13 The U.S. created the Social Progress Trust Fund as another concessional lending window within the IADB under 
direct U.S. control in 1960, but by 1965 it had been merged into the FSO. 
 As a result, US$1.46 billion of the IADB’s US$2.43 billion in total 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
IBRD IADB 
%
 
Borrowing 
Countries 
Non-Borrowing 
Countries 
lending commitments up to 1967 (63%) was at concessional interest rates, while the remainder 
was at the regular lending rate. By contrast, of the World Bank’s US$7.2 billion in total global 
loan commitments over the same period, only US$1.7 billion (24%) was in concessional lending.  
 
Because of generous U.S. support, the IADB was considerably less exercised than the World 
Bank had been in its early years to ingratiate itself with private capital markets. As one early 
observer of the IADB noted, “The bank has not felt itself constrained, as its sister institutions 
have done, to tailor its operations to fit the assumed expectations of the prospective purchasers of 
its bonds” (White 1975: 182). Also, the task itself was much less difficult than it had been in the 
late 1940s, because of all the work the World Bank had already done to ease market concerns 
about a multilateral bank. The IADB’s first debt issuance in the U.S. was rated AAA with a 
minimum of fuss, and sold out in short order at the same terms as World Bank bonds in the same 
year (IADB, 1963). Thus, the very same conservative financial policies of the World Bank that 
in large measure led to the creation of the IADB allowed the new bank to immediately 
differentiate itself from its predecessor in ways that suited both its borrowing members and its 
dominant shareholder.  
 
The strong U.S. commitments of concessional resources gave the IADB considerable leeway, 
both rhetorically and operationally. The Economist magazine, in an article on the IADB’s 
creation, noted that the new bank’s goals included “rather striking new specifications for social 
reform” (1960: 241). The very first loan made by the IADB was for a water and sanitation 
system in Arequipa, Peru—a clear statement of the new bank’s intentions (IADB, 1961). 
Lending in the early years of the IADB followed these new priorities. Two-thirds of all lending 
commitments in the first four years of operations were for industry and social infrastructure, 
compared to only 4% by the World Bank in the same years to Latin America and 15% globally.14
 
 
By contrast, only 10% of total IADB lending was for electric power and transportation 
infrastructure, compared to 88% for the World Bank in Latin America and 70% globally.  
The IADB also lent to all member countries, regardless of their policies or relationship with the 
U.S. One interesting case in point was Brazil, governed by a left-leaning administration from 
1958 to 1964 that vocally opposed the U.S. The World Bank granted no loans to Brazil between 
1958 and 1965, while the IADB granted numerous loans every year to Brazil, with no apparent 
objection from the U.S. Similarly, Colombia engaged in a heated dispute with the IMF in the 
mid-1960s over macroeconomic policies (Dell, 1972), which led a halt in World Bank lending 
during 1965. Again, the IADB continued lending to the country throughout. It would seem that 
the U.S., intent on repairing relations with the hemisphere, was willing—for the time being—to 
resist the temptation to use its power in the IADB to further its own interests, and allow the 
IADB to build a reputation for solidarity among Latin Americans. 
 
Something New—But Will it be Sustained? 
 
By 1968, the U.S. was looking at a dramatically different set of circumstances than at the start of 
the decade. In Latin America, the U.S. was actively supporting the growing militarization of the 
region’s political systems, which limited the threat of communist takeovers. At the same time, 
                                                 
14 The difference between Latin American and world lending sectoral breakdowns for the World Bank may indicate 
a small degree of substitution effect, with the World Bank taking into account the IADB’s operations.  
Vietnam had become an expensive fiasco, domestic fiscal policy was escaping control and the 
country was facing increasingly severe balance of payments problems. Support for foreign aid in 
the U.S. Congress was on the decline. In light of these developments, the U.S. began scaling 
back contributions to the IADB. After giving over US$2 billion in concessional resources in the 
first eight years of IADB operations, it contributed only US$500 million in the subsequent eight 
years, and that only after long delays by Congress. The U.S. also began to block lending to 
countries with which it had business disputes, notably nationalization moves against U.S. 
companies in Chile and Peru. Leftist Peruvian President Juan Velasco railed against the U.S. at 
the 1971 Board of Governors meeting in Lima for halting loans to his country because of a 
nationalization dispute—a sign of the tensions brewing at the IADB: “We believe that the time 
has come for a calm and complete reappraisal of the real effectiveness of an institution which, 
like the Inter-American Development Bank, shows signs of being used as a tool for political 
pressure against countries which, like Peru, are determined to break with the past” (IADB 1971: 
26). 
 
Declining concessional contributions coupled with the growing interventionist attitude of the 
U.S. in lending operations spurred IADB management to seek new sources of funding. The 
IADB management saw greater use of OC compared to FSO resources as a way to make the 
IADB less susceptible to U.S. pressure, as President Antonio Ortiz Mena spelled out in a 1973 
speech: “…it is perfectly clear that the Latin American countries as a whole have sufficient 
voting power to approve loans granted with the ordinary resources of the Bank. A very different 
case is that of the Bank’s operations financed with the resources of the Fund for Special 
Operations” where the U.S. had a veto on all loan approvals (IADB 1973: 48). If the Latin 
countries wish to reduce the power of the U.S. in IADB operations, then strengthening the OC 
window and depending less on FSO was the way forward.  
 
Ramping up non-concessional lending, however, required the IADB to have access to a steady 
stream of bond purchasers. This, in turn, required the IADB to pay much more attention than 
previously to convince the markets that its securities were a safe investment, much like the 
World Bank. Thus it comes as no surprise that by the early 1970s, IADB operational and 
financial policies increasingly began resembling the World Bank’s. In a 1972 speech to the 
IADB’s Board of Governors, Ortiz Mena alluded to the need for the IADB to pay close attention 
to the views of bond holders when considering loan applications in light of the greater need to 
raise money on the markets: “…we should bear in mind that the financial soundness of the Bank 
and its loan portfolio is subject to constant appraisal when it has recourse to capital markets” 
(IADB 1972: 157). 
 
The change was most dramatic in what types of projects the IADB supported in the first half of 
the 1970s compared to a decade earlier. The IADB’s early enthusiasm for lending to industry—a 
Latin American priority—began to abate. By 1970 direct private lending had dropped to only 6% 
of total OC lending, and it was cut off entirely after that year, while loans to national 
development banks fell from 46% of OC commitments in 1961-64 to 14% in 1970-74. Social 
infrastructure lending also declined sharply. By contrast, the IADB rapidly scaled up lending to 
traditional infrastructure projects such as highways and electric power (Fig. 3). This new pattern 
was very close to the lending priorities of the World Bank, in sharp contrast to their divergence 
in the early 1960s (Fig. 4).  
 Figure 3. IADB Commitments by Sector 
 
Source: IADB annual reports, 1961-64 and 1970-75. Includes both non-concessional (OC) and 
concessional (FSO) lending windows. 
 
Figure 4. World Bank and IADB Commitments by Sector, 1970-75 
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Source: IADB and World Bank annual reports, 1970-75. Both MDBs include the concessional (IDA and 
FSO) and non-concessional (IBRD and OC) lending windows. 
 
Branching Out to Non-Regional Members 
 
The IADB faced another problem starting in the early 1970s: with its growing balance of 
payments difficulties, the U.S. government limited IADB bond issues in the New York market 
(IADB, 1970a). The only other markets available for bond issues were in Europe and Japan, but 
the IADB faced serious obstacles in accessing those markets, including regulations, high taxes 
(up to 2.5% per issue, compared to the tax-exempt status of World Bank bonds) and outright 
prohibitions (IADB, 1965a). The key point was membership, as the IADB acknowledged in a 
1965 study: “The IADB has found that these countries give preference to certain countries linked 
to them politically or economically, or to international institutions of which the country is a 
member” (Ibid.: 65, author’s translation). Europeans understandably viewed the IADB as 
dominated by the U.S., and they had no interest in offering it the advantages enjoyed by 
international organizations such as the World Bank or the European Investment Bank, which 
they were members of and had a voice in. The only mechanism by which non-member countries 
offered significant capital was loans or credit lines tied to purchases of export goods, which the 
IADB accepted grudgingly, as President Herrera noted in 1965: “We have made it clear that the 
Bank’s role in these transactions is not that of an instrument designed to promote exports by 
developed countries” (IADB 1965b: 16, author’s translation).  
 
In his farewell address to the Board of Governors in 1970, President Herrera stated that financial 
pressures were leading the IADB to reconsider its original intention of limiting membership to 
countries in the region: “In the case of non-member countries, this encourages us to seek other 
formulas designed to maintain an adequate additional flow of resources…including possible 
formal association of those countries with our organization” (IADB 1970b: 67). Canada was 
admitted to the IADB with little controversy in 1972 (IADB, 1973), but the financial impact was 
minimal. A more thorny matter was the admission of prospective members from Europe and 
Japan. From the point of view of the IADB, these countries represented a critical financial 
lifeline, as noted by Ortiz Mena in 1973: “Their membership will facilitate our access to certain 
capital markets on more favorable conditions than at present…Furthermore, the diversification of 
sources will help diminish the possibility of sharp fluctuations in the flow of funds received by 
the Bank” (IADB 1973: 50).  
 
The move to bring in countries from outside the region did not sit easily with all borrowing 
countries. Peru’s representative to the IADB Board of Governors gave guarded approval to the 
expansion: “…we trust that before long we may be able to extend an equally cordial welcome to 
other countries of Europe and Asia, on the understanding that their presence will not imply 
political interference…” (IADB, 1972: 7-8). Speeches by the representatives of Argentina, 
Venezuela and Peru at IADB meetings in 1973 and 1974 also voiced suspicion of admitting non-
regional members, and spoke of the need to “Latin Americanize” the bank, including an 
unsuccessful proposal to move its headquarters to Latin America.  
 
Despite these misgivings, nine non-regional countries were admitted on July 9, 1976: Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Israel, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. The 
new members contributed US$372 million to FSO and US$372 million in ordinary capital, of 
which US$61.5 million (16.5%) was in cash and the remainder on call. Equally important, new 
members granted the IADB full legal and tax status as an international organization, and 
facilitated the placement of bonds in their capital markets. The results were immediate. IADB 
debt issued in non-member countries had averaged US$53 million per year in 1961-75, but that 
immediately jumped to US$252 million in 1976—almost twice the previous record amount in 
one year (US$145 million in 1969) (IADB AR 1961-76). In 1977 the IADB floated its first 
public bond in Japan, and borrowing also ramped up sharply in the German and Swiss markets 
(IADB AR 1977). This new level was sustained going forward, with the IADB issuing on 
average US$221.5 million each year 1976-1980 (IADB AR 1976-80).   
 
Summarizing IADB Findings 
 
The IADB was created directly in opposition to the World Bank. Its aim was to lend for 
development projects that the World Bank would not touch, especially social infrastructure and 
private industry; to offer more concessional resources; to reduce political influence in lending; 
and to generally take a less market-focused view of its development mission. It was successful in 
all these areas in the first years of its existence, specifically because of the very high level of 
concessional resources committed to it by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, in reaction 
to U.S. fears of social revolt in the Americas.  
 
But as U.S. support for concessional lending began to wane and IADB’s access to New York 
markets was restricted in the late 1960s, the model quickly began showing its limitations. By 
1970, the IADB shifted its focus to non-concessional lending, which didn’t depend on U.S. 
contributions and also afforded Latin countries greater operational control due to voting rules. 
The shift to non-concessional lending, however, necessitated greater access to private markets to 
raise capital. This in turn led to a dramatic change in lending patterns, away from social 
infrastructure and private industry and toward the type of power and transport projects favored 
by the World Bank to impress potential bond buyers. And in a bid to access more resources in 
the face of restricted U.S. capital markets, the IADB sacrificed a degree of its Latin American 
character and allowed members from outside the region. Thus the evolution of the IADB 
between its founding in 1959 and the mid-1970s puts in sharp relief how the pressures of 
securing the resources needed to function to a large measure dictated not only the bank’s 
operations but its very membership structure.  
 
 
 
CAF: The Challenges of Going it Alone  
 
Like the IADB, the Andean Development Corporation (Corporacion Andina de Fomento—
CAF)—founded in 1968—was envisioned by its creators to be a new sort of MDB, one that 
would undertake a different type of development activity than either the World Bank or the 
IADB. The CAF was to promote economic integration among its six South American member 
countries, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, as part of broader regional 
integration efforts prevalent in Latin America at that time. The operational structure of the CAF 
mirrored the World Bank and IADB in many important respects, including government 
ownership and a loan-based financial model. Within this broad model, however, the CAF 
differed from the World Bank and IADB in a number of important respects.  
 
Most notable was the composition of the shareholding countries themselves: they were all 
developing countries expecting to borrow from the CAF. As well, participating countries would 
have more equitable control over the CAF through the creation of different types of shares, 
which allowed wealthy countries (Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) to contribute more 
capital, but still giving poorer countries (Bolivia and Ecuador) significant voting power (Fresard, 
1969). The orientation of the CAF’s financial services was also intended to be markedly different 
from the World Bank and IADB. Industry, and to a lesser extent agribusiness and trade support, 
were to be the explicit and exclusive focus of the CAF’s activities (Ibid.). Financial support 
could be supplied in a broader range of ways than other MDBs, including to “emit bonds or 
debentures, act as a guarantor of any type, provide collateral for obligations, and grant 
guarantees in share issues”, i.e. act as an underwriter (CAF, 1974, Art. 4).  
 
Among the many problems facing the CAF when it opened its doors for business in 1970, by far 
the most pressing was raising resources with which to operate. The six founding countries had 
committed US$25 million in capital, but this would only be paid in over the course of several 
years, making it essential that the CAF quickly find other sources of capital to intermediate. The 
expectation was that this capital would mainly come from outside the region. As the Chilean 
negotiator blithely stated, “…the majority of the resources that the Corporation will employ will 
not come from its own capital, but from traditional sources available in the developed world for 
the purposes of economic and social development” (Fresard 1969: 33, author’s translation), 
evidently meaning soft loans from bilateral aid agencies of developed countries or other, larger 
MDBs. As well, the CAF intended to issue debt on private capital markets in Europe and North 
America, as envisioned in its charter. 
 
Initial impressions seemed positive: U.S. AID provided a US$15 million soft loan in 1971, and 
Canada soon followed suit with another US$5 million. Further financial contributions were 
expected from the World Bank and the IADB (CAF AR 1971: 33). The CAF sent out a financial 
mission to Europe, Japan and North America in 1971 to test the waters regarding access to other 
public and private sources of capital in the form of credit lines, bond issues and bank loans. The 
mission reported receiving a “favorable and positive impression on the aims of the organization” 
(Ibid.: 34, author’s translation) in international financial circles. One of the stops was in 
Switzerland, where CAF officials met with the banking giant UBS to “understand the conditions 
under which the institution could in the near future place in the world capital markets a long-term 
bond issue” (Ibid.: 34, author’s translation). 
 
Harsh Realities 
 
These optimistic plans soon came up against a much less forgiving reality. U.S. AID’s loan, 
which the CAF saw as just an “initial” contribution (Ibid.: 34, author’s translation), was never 
increased, nor was the Canadian loan. Efforts to raise money from European governments were 
similarly limited, with the 1975 Annual Report reduced to playing up the fact that a CAF 
European mission had even been received by “high officials” at all (CAF AR 1975: 16, author’s 
translation). The IADB was similarly uncooperative. After an initial loan of US$750,000 for 
technical assistance purposes, no further resources were forthcoming. Hopeful mention is made 
in the 1974 Annual Report of obtaining from the World Bank “technical and financial 
cooperation for the programs of the CAF and, eventually, a line of credit” (CAF AR 1974: 25, 
author’s translation), which never materialized. With U.S. enthusiasm for development aid 
dwindling, and the lack of any shareholding influence by the U.S. or European nations, 
developed country governments apparently saw little incentive to supply resources to the CAF. 
 
Progress was even slower with the private markets. Neither U.S. nor European capital markets 
showed any inclination to invest in CAF bonds. Following a 1974 mission to New York 
investment banks, the CAF concluded that “during 1975 there will be possibilities to raise 
US$15-25 million in a private placement, as a first step before a future public offer” (Ibid.: 23, 
author’s translation). No such placement took place. Talks with European and Asian banks that 
same year were similarly fruitless. Even with the huge boom in petrodollar lending to Latin 
America, it was not until 1977 that the CAF was finally able to conclude a sizeable bank loan, 
for US$50 million from a syndicate of European, Japanese and U.S. banks. With no developed 
country to back up its financial obligations—only six relatively poor Latin American countries, 
two governed by leftist administrations whose leaders regularly railed against the evils of 
capitalism—financiers in developed countries were not enthusiastic about lending it money.  
 
Like the IADB in the 1960s, credit lines and loans tied to exports were the only significant 
financing offered by countries outside the Andean region: US$6 million each from Brazil and 
Mexico in 1973, US$10 million from Japan’s Ex-Im Bank in 1974, various projects purchases 
funded jointly by the U.S. Ex-Im Bank and Bank of America (at high interest rates) and US$10 
million by the Spanish Export Bank in 1977 (CAF AR, 1973, 1974 and 1975). As with the 
IADB, the CAF sought to avoid credit lines tied to exports, as they restricted the usefulness of 
loans to borrowers. The 1973 Annual Report highlights “the necessity that [external] loans and 
credit lines be granted totally untied and in conditions that facilitate their use in programs 
compatible with the necessities of the CAF” (CAF AR 1973: 20, author’s translation). 
 
If the CAF’s liability situation was difficult during its first decade, its asset side was equally so. 
Right from the start the bank ran up against the tensions between its idealistic mandate of 
promoting regional integration and the more parochial desires of individual member 
governments. The CAF sent out an initial mission in 1971 to put together a portfolio of potential 
projects. However, as that year’s annual report noted, “The most common characteristics of these 
projects and initiatives was their limited integration content. The majority had strictly national 
characteristics…” (CAF AR 1971: 21, author’s translation). This problem was mentioned 
repeatedly in early annual reports. The solution was to partially relax the CAF’s standards in the 
interests of making loans. In an article describing this period, the CAF’s second president 
recalled that “pressured by the need to survive, the CAF had to move ahead with projects that 
were not strictly in accord with the restrictive parameters of its mandate” (CAF 1990: 28, 
author’s translation). That is, the CAF’s original core mandate of promoting regional integration 
quickly took a back seat to the necessity of finding projects to fund. 
 
Figure 5. CAF Lending Commitments (millions 1973 US$) 
 
 Source: CAF annual reports, 1973-1984. 
Note: SAFICO refers to short-term trade finance of not more than 90 days.  
 
By partially relaxing its project lending requirements and initiating short-term trade financing 
(called SAFICO), the CAF began to build lending, with annual commitments rising from US$33 
million in 1973 to US$107 million in 1976 (of which US$17 million was trade financing). 
However, lending reversed sharply in 1977 as a result of the withdrawal of Chile as well as 
reduced demand for loans by member governments due to easy access to petrodollar syndicated 
loans, and continued on a downward trend to 1981 (Fig. 5). Equally troubling was the CAF’s 
operating results, with three years of net losses (1975, 1977 and 1978), reflecting not only to 
difficulties finding appropriate projects but also the CAF’s high cost of funding, which made it 
problematic to on-lend at terms that were both acceptable to borrowers and able to generate net 
income for the CAF. 
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Changing Direction in the 1980s 
 
By 1981, the CAF’s finances were in a precarious state, with only US$15 million in loans 
committed that year. From this low point, the CAF began reorienting its strategy and rebuilding 
itself as a viable financial intermediary. Leaving behind an operational model predicated on 
mediating bilateral and multilateral resources that never materialized and hamstrung by a 
mandate to promote a regional integration process that was at best stagnating, the CAF began to 
reinvent itself as an MDB much closer to the model of the IADB and World Bank. In his 1981 
inaugural speech, President José Corsino Cárdenas called for the CAF to “adjust its institutional 
structure and launch new initiatives such that it can convert itself into…a true financial agent for 
its shareholders and an organization that does more than just survive” (CAF 1981: 13, author’s 
translation).  
 
This meant, first and foremost, revamping the CAF’s operational activities to boost its 
attractiveness as a potential lender. The board approved a new Operations Policy in 1983, 
“broadening the realm of activities for the promotion, development and financing of projects” 
(CAF AR 1983: 7, author’s translation). The aim was to “overcome the limitations of the 
existing operations policy, designed basically for industrial programming and free trade within 
the Andean Group” and now “attend more directly the sectors that most contributed to the 
economic development of the countries such as agriculture, agroindustry, physical integration, 
and other areas previously not addressed by the CAF” (CAF 1986, author’s translation). In other 
words, regional integration—the CAF’s original raison d’etre—was no longer the top of even 
main priority of lending, but rather projects of national interest. As well, CAF loans increasingly 
went directly to governments or government-run companies and development banks, rather than 
higher-risk private sector borrowers—similar to the trend in IADB lending in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.  
 
As a result, CAF lending stabilized and began growing again in the 1980s, partly assisted no 
doubt by the dire need for financing by member governments during the post-1982 crisis years. 
Project loan commitments climbed from US$40 million in 1982 to US$263 million in 1990 
(CAF AR, 1980-1990). Perhaps as importantly, the CAF began selecting projects much more 
carefully, as indicated by the reduction in cancelled projects from 43% of total value during 
1971-1980 to 10.6% in 1982-1986 (CAF, 1986). The overall financial stability of the institution 
was on a much more solid foundation, with net income up from US$1.8 million in 1980 to 
US$35 million in 1990 (Fig. 6).  
 
The evolution of reserves is even more telling about the CAF’s metamorphosis. Reserves were 
actually in negative territory for much of the 1970s, after being used to cover operating losses in 
1976 and 1978, and totaled a mere US$300,000 in 1980. The incoming administration in 1981 
began systematically building reserves each year, evidently cognizant of the importance of 
building up the CAF’s reputation as a solid financial institution in the eyes of potential suppliers 
of capital. By 1986, reserves totaled US$22 million, climbing to over US$100 million in 1990 
(Figure 7). This, it should be noted, came at the expense of borrowers, who paid higher interests 
rates on their loans to generate resources for reserves.15
                                                 
15 The use of higher interest rates to generate net income for, among other uses, reserves, is a highly contested issue 
between borrower and non-borrower shareholders at the IADB and World Bank, as discussed in Humphrey (2013). 
That has never been a topic of significant conflict at the CAF, since the shareholders and borrowers are one and the 
same, and all had and have an interest in the CAF’s financial strength.  
 As well, the administration convinced 
shareholders to allow the CAF to keep unallocated net income on its books as it began to 
accumulate in the 1980s, rather than redistributing it to shareholders. By 1990, accumulated net 
income totaled US$28 million—useful to generate extra interest income, as well as a liquidity 
cushion offering additional confidence to potential investors.  
 
Figure 6. CAF Net Income (millions current US$) 
 
Source: CAF annual reports, 1974-1993. 
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Figure 7. CAF Reserves + Retained Earnings (millions current US$) 
 
Source: CAF annual reports, 1974-1993 
 
Coming Into Its Own 
 
As was the case with the IADB in the 1960s and early 1970s, it was increasingly apparent to the 
CAF that bilateral and multilateral sources of soft loans would be limited and fickle, and the 
more easily available bilateral credit lines tied to exports of developed countries severely 
restricted the CAF’s ability to fund different types of projects. The answer would be private 
capital markets, as President Galo Montano stated in a 1989 speech: “Our interest in freeing 
ourselves from the dependence on the type of resources that we currently channel has led us to 
study ways of raising resources on the international market” (CAF 1989: 10, author’s 
translation). The overhaul of operations and finances to stabilize the CAF and project a more 
conservative, financially reliable image positioned the CAF well when international capital flows 
to developing countries began to pick up again in the 1990s.  
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One point in the CAF’s favor from the point of view of potential creditors was the fact that no 
sovereign borrower had ever defaulted on a loan, even though four of the CAF’s five member 
governments were in default to international markets at some point.  Even when Peru suspended 
paying international debt and fell into arrears with the World Bank, IMF and the IADB in the 
mid-1980s, it continued servicing all obligations to the CAF.16 This repayment record—far 
superior to that of the World Bank and IADB17
 
—highlights the fact that the CAF’s borrower-
only membership structure engenders a strong sense of ownership and responsibility among 
borrowers.  
Indications that others outside the region were beginning to take notice of the CAF’s unsurpassed 
repayment record and the reforms to its operations came in 1989, with the first placement of a 
US$2.5 million private bond with First Interstate Bank, followed the next year by a three-year, 
US$15 million bond placed privately in Japan at the attractive rate of Libor +1% (CAF AR 1989 
and 1990). This was a critical sign of confidence of the private markets in the CAF’s financial 
probity. In 1990 the CAF received US$30 million in untied credit lines from German and Dutch 
banks, and further untied loans from First Interstate for US$8 million (CAF AR 1990). Another 
indication of shareholder confidence was the increase in authorized capital by US$1 billion in 
1990, to a total of US$2.05 billion (CAF AR 1990). 
  
                                                 
16 As of end-2012, it remains the case that no CAF loan to sovereign borrowers has ever gone into arrears.  
17 A total of 22 countries have fallen behind by six months or more since the World Bank’s inception, including six 
in Latin America (Nicaragua, Guyana, Peru, Panama, Honduras and Guatemala). A number of these countries did 
not paid their loans for several years, including eight years for Nicaragua (1984-1992) and six for Peru (1987-1993). 
As well, while the World Bank has never written off a loan in a strictest sense, it has removed non-performing loans 
from IBRD’s balance sheet by moving them to IDA and also as part of various debt relief initiatives. The IADB has 
had five sovereigns going into non-accrual (no payments for six months or longer) since 1960, and shorter arrears 
have been very common. The IADB has also removed loans in arrears through debt relief initiatives.  
The quantum leap in the CAF’s performance came with the arrival of Luis Enrique García as 
president in 1991. An IADB staffer for 17 years, García completed the transition of the CAF’s 
business model to one much closer to the IADB. He was clear about his goal right from the start, 
as he described in a later interview: “When I joined the CAF, particularly because of my 
experience with the IDB, I saw the future of the CAF as an institution relying essentially on 
CAF’s ability to tap the international capital market. Because if it was only relying on the old 
capital or short term lines of credit or even loans from the IDB, the institution really had no 
chance to grow” (Latin Finance 1998: 147). Thus, while the CAF was already being pushed by 
the realities of its organizational model and finances in the direction of the other two MDBs, 
García had the experience and clarity of vision to see that process through. 
 
But for the CAF to raise significant resources on the markets at a price that permitted the CAF to 
on-lend at reasonable rates, “it was a must to have an investment grade rating,” García noted in 
the same interview (Ibid.). Immediately after taking charge in 1991, García traveled to New 
York to obtain a rating from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. This was an ambitious request, 
considering that not a single borrower in Latin America had investment grade, and that four of 
the five government shareholders of the CAF were among the most notorious debt trouble spots 
in the world during the 1980s. The CAF hired consultants from Coopers and Lybrand and a 
former World Bank vice president to review the CAF’s operations and make recommendations 
for overhauling internal process, and revised operational and financial policies “with the aim of 
broadening its sources of financing” (CAF AR 1992: 57, author’s translation).  
 
As with the IADB in the 1970s, the CAF found it expedient to set aside its character as an 
Andean organization and accept new non-Andean members with the specific aim of better access 
to capital markets. Mexico joined in 1990, Chile returned in 1992 and Trinidad and Tobago 
joined in 1993, although from the start García expressed his intention to bring in developed 
countries as well: “Not only the incorporation of other regional countries, but to fix as a goal the 
incorporation of industrialized countries. This will significantly facilitate the access of the CAF 
to international markets” (CAF 1991: 17-18, author’s translation).  
 
Figure 8. CAF Project Lending Commitments, 1989-94 
 
Source: CAF annual reports 1989-1994.  
 
Standard & Poor’s issued the CAF an investment grade rating in 1993, soon followed by 
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resources from outside the region than it had in its entire previous two decades combined. Project 
lending commitments increased by more than a factor of 10 in the five years between 1989 ($103 
million) and 1994 ($1.4 billion)—a truly remarkable growth rate (Fig. 8). The benefits of the 
CAF’s reorientation toward the private markets were thus immediately clear to all involved. 
 
Summarizing CAF Findings 
 
Like the IADB, the CAF was founded explicitly to address the limitations of existing MDBs, by 
extending credit to private industry under a regional integration framework and avoiding the 
US’s increasing heavy-handed influence in the IADB. While the CAF’s borrower-only 
membership freed it from the political influence of wealthy countries, it also imposed serious 
limitations on raising resources. International capital markets showed no interest whatsoever in 
investing in the CAF, and bilateral/multilateral sources were also wary, seeing little upside to 
supporting an MDB over which they would have no influence and appeared financially 
precarious.  
 
Facing the prospect of failure, the CAF began to build a new image of financial probity in the 
1980s to access new financing. Shareholders significantly loosened lending policy, the 
administration was revamped and financial reserves began to build. The hard work of the 1980s, 
combined with the arrival of President García in 1991 and the admission of new, non-Andean 
members—specifically with the goal of increasing access to capital markets, as with the IADB in 
the 1970s—led the ratings agencies to grant the CAF investment grade status in 1993. The 
investment grade rating and support of new members directly led to the tremendous growth of 
CAF borrowing and lending that began in the early 1990s and has continued to the present.  
 
By 1994, the CAF’s initial parochial vision had given way to a much more open operational style 
designed to access private markets around the world and to provide whatever financial services 
its clientele required. Its original vision was simply unworkable, both in the projects it sought to 
lend to and in its strategy to raise resources. Rather than go out of business, the CAF undertook 
the reforms it needed to survive and thrive, moving it much closer to the financial model of the 
World Bank and IADB.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The experiences of the World Bank, IADB and CAF over the course of their creation and early 
years of operations provide compelling evidence that political and financial pressures combined 
to generate an almost “ideal” financial-operational model for multilateral development banks, to 
which each of the three MDBs eventually conformed, despite the original intentions of their 
creators. The reality that governments would not be willing to supply large amounts of budgetary 
resources for the MDBs to intermediate required that all three rely increasingly on private capital 
markets to raise resources. While founders did foresee MDBs utilizing bond markets for funding, 
the degree of dependence on markets turned out to be much higher than originally planned in 
each case. The perceptions and exigencies of bond buyers, in turn, pushed the MDBs to modify 
their operational procedures and even basic shareholding structure substantially different from 
the original intentions of founders, with the specific aim of securing a reliable source of funding. 
 Of the three, the World Bank moved most quickly and decisively to incorporate market-based 
criteria into its operations. This was due in part to the lack of any other options when it began 
operations, in light of the non-viability of the originally planned use of guarantees rather than 
direct loans, the unwillingness of any shareholder except the U.S. to allow their capital 
contribution to be used and the pressing need for resources. The Wall Street ethos quickly 
established firm control of World Bank operational style, offering loans only to the most 
creditworthy borrowers for projects expected to generate cash returns in the short term. It was 
not until the late 1950s, flush with cash and facing growing complaints to lend more, that this 
organizational culture was diluted to a degree with the creation of IDA. Even this step back 
toward the development style intended for the World Bank by its New Deal founders was 
limited, and concerns of financial rectitude remain a high priority, as evidence by continued 
battles between management and shareholders about loan pricing, reserve levels and net income 
policy (see Mohammed, 2004 and Humphrey, 2013).  
 
The early trajectory of the IADB demonstrates that an MDB does not in theory require such 
strong subservience to the whims of potential bondholders, as long as it enjoys strong financial 
backing from one or more governments. Generous U.S. contributions of concessional resources 
allowed the IADB to take a radically different approach to development lending, one that 
emphasized lending much more in alignment with the priorities of borrowing countries and with 
less obsession with “bankable” projects. Once this U.S. support waned in the late 1960s, the 
IADB reoriented its operations and even membership structure as a Latin American bank to 
ensure the resources it needed to continue serving as a lender and to keep U.S. policy pressure at 
arm’s length. By switching the types of projects it supported to a profile much closer to the 
World Bank and opening up its membership to countries from Europe and Japan, the IADB 
secured a dramatic increase in available financing, at the cost of its original vision for the kind of 
MDB it would be.  
 
The CAF’s evolution demonstrates the same point, but from a different angle. Its founders 
intended to differentiate their operations also, but apparently thought they could do so without 
any wealthy country backing it. The CAF eventually realized, however, that while having only 
borrowing countries as shareholders offered a notable degree of operational flexibility, finding 
financing to intermediate from outside its members was another question altogether. Thus by the 
1980s it, too, had turned its focus to what it needed to do to gain access to greater external 
sources of finance. This meant reshaping policies on lending, rigorously building up net income 
and reserves (at the expense of offering less expensive loans), and opening membership to non-
Andean countries. As with the IADB, the original vision of an inward-looking MDB with limited 
membership concentrating on specific types of projects was left by the wayside when that model 
proved ineffective. As the subsequent growth of the CAF has shown—now with 18 shareholding 
countries including Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Panama, Spain and Portugal—expanding 
membership has greatly improved diversified its loan portfolio and capital strength, leading to 
steadily improving bond ratings and better access to capital markets.  
 
The experiences of the World Bank, IADB and CAF outlined here suggest that whatever the 
composition of their shareholders, only with major financial support from a wealthy nation or 
nations is it possible to establish a different kind of MDB from the ones we see today. In the 
absence of that support, MDBs of necessity must access private financial markets to raise the 
resources they need to effectively operate. This is in fact one of the great strengths of the MDB 
model: it is to a large degree self-financing, requiring very little direct fiscal contributions from 
member countries for regular operations. The flip side, however, is that it also requires MDBs to 
keep a very close eye on the whims of private capital markets when shaping their operational and 
financial policies. The similar trajectories of other MDBs—notably the African Development 
Bank (see Mingst, 1990 and Strand, 2001)—suggest that the patterns discussed here can be 
applied to MDBs more generally, although doing so is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Whether this reliance on capital markets and the operational pressures that come along with it is 
“good” for development is an extremely complex question, and one that cannot be systematically 
answered here. However, a few points related to this issue are worth considering. First, 
emphasizing “specific projects” in development lending is not necessarily a bad thing—clearly 
borrowing countries need much of the physical infrastructure that these sorts of loans finance if 
they are to develop their economies. It may be that program (budget support) lending and more 
socially-oriented projects are also essential, and indeed all three MDBs have moved in this 
direction in recent years. But a priori one cannot state categorically that the project-focused 
lending practices emphasized to reassure bond buyers is inherently less good for development—
this would require examining the specific context and development outcomes of each country in 
question. 
 
Second, the MDB financial model has been spectacularly successful in leveraging very 
significant amounts of resources and on-lending them very cheaply to developing countries, far 
cheaper than they could access from other sources. Providing highly concessional loans or grants 
would be (arguably) more advantageous for the recipient countries, but that is unlikely to be 
realistic or sustainable over the medium term, in light of the budgetary realities this would imply 
to donor countries. The experience of the IADB discussed here clearly highlights this. Hence, 
while dependence on capital market demands may not be ideal, it may also be by far the best 
available option, absent any major shift in attitude among wealthy countries about transferring 
resources.  
 
Third, dependence on capital markets does have the benefit—from the point of view of MDB 
staff—of limiting the political pressure brought to bear by shareholding countries. Since MDBs 
fund themselves for most recurrent operations, this provides a degree of insulation from the 
“power of the purse” exercised over agencies (IOs and others) that depend on direct budgetary 
handouts. This higher degree of autonomy may partly explain why MDBs are uniquely 
susceptible to principal-agent dynamics, as explored by many researchers.18 It also explains why 
periodic capital increases19
                                                 
18 This dynamic has interesting parallels to the way New York infrastructure builder extraordinaire Robert Moses 
amassed and exercised power for so many decades, at times against the wishes of New York City mayors, state 
governors, and even the U.S. president. As described in Robert Caro’s 1974 masterpiece The Power Broker, the key 
to Moses’ power was the fact that he had himself written the law creating the Triborough Authority in such a way 
that it could issue bonds based on its own revenues. Hence Moses depended on no one but Wall Street bond buyers 
for resources, and he made sure that he kept Wall Street happy. Considering that Moses was at the height of his 
powers when the World Bank was created, and that the early leaders of the Bank were all Wall Street insiders 
certainly well aware of Moses’ activities, it may well be his power and financial autonomy from politicians was an 
explicit model for the way they ran the Bank.   
 and concessional window replenishments are such contentious 
episodes for the IADB and World Bank—this is the window of opportunity for wealthy 
shareholders to exercise direct budgetary control and force through policy changes to their liking. 
19 All MDBs periodically receive capital increases to expand their operational scope. The capital is not a direct 
transfer to an MDB’s budget, but rather adds to its capital base, from which it generates resources through bond 
issues (as well as some investment income). The vast majority of capital (over 90%) for the World Bank and IADB 
is in the form of a guarantee, and hence is not actually transferred at all. The CAF has a much higher share of paid-in 
capital, because of the nature of its shareholders.  
These are the “tail that wags the dog”, in the words of one researcher referring to IDA 
replenishments (Kapur, 2002: 34). 
 
Despite the three potential upsides to depending on bond markets for financing, there is no 
question that these organizations were created to promote “development”—a fundamentally 
political mission—and not act simply as banks. Needless to say, these two priorities do not 
always sit easily with one another, and the experiences reviewed here suggest that financial 
considerations usually have the last word. The creation of the concessional lending windows was 
clearly a recognition of this on the part of shareholder governments, though it may not go far 
enough, depending on one’s views on how development should be promoted.  
 
Regardless, the MDB financial model as described above here depends on another factor not 
analyzed here—a steady stream of borrowers for their loans. The rapid rise of numerous middle-
income countries—heretofore by far the largest borrowers from MDBs—and the explosive 
growth of international capital flows may mean this model needs rethinking to face a new set of 
financial pressures. The recently announced overhaul of World Bank operations by President Jim 
Yong Kim and ongoing reforms at the IADB may indicate that, once again, MDBs are reshaping 
themselves in response to external pressure to secure resources. 
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